Chief: Research and Development
Professional Communications, Inc.
ABSTRACT
A sample of 4,240 engineers from all levels was compared to a sample of 29,893 people from other professions. The purpose was to assess the strengths and vulnerabilities embedded in the structure of the engineering profession.
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THE SAMPLE
Table 1 outlines the sample used in the study (see
Footnote #1 for job titles included in categories).
Table 1
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
The
large number of organizations gives assurance that the findings are
not particular to a company or industry. The nationality column suggests a
level of international representation. However most of the respondents are
domiciled in the United States. Overall, sample is a reasonable representation
of the engineering profession.
INTERNAL ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION
A study on the Engineering Personality (Salton, 2012; see Footnote #2 for reference) focused on professional level Engineers. It found that engineers tended to favor particular types of information flows that set them apart from other professions. This study extends that research to embrace all levels of the engineering hierarchy.
Graphic 1 plots engineering’s commitment to
the four basic information processing styles (see Footnote #3 for “style” explanation
reference). Earlier research has shown that commitment to
spontaneous RI and RS information processing styles usually increase with
rank. The logically disciplined LP and
HA styles usually decline (Organizational Rank and Strategic Style, 2008; see
Footnote #4 for reference). These overall trend lines are in evidence in engineering
but at much more subdued levels.
The major difference centers on RS
style—decisive action taken with limited information. This style typically
rises with higher position. For engineers it is essentially flat (see upper left
quadrant in Graphic 1)
Graphic 1
"IOPT" INFORMATION PROCESSING STYLES
AT DIFFERENT ENGINEERING ORGANIZATIONAL LEVELS 
The
decisive RS style is distinct from other professions. The direction of the
three later styles (i.e.,
lower LP and HA, higher RI) is similar to other professions. But the change between
levels is much less. This is best seen by comparing the degree of change from
one engineering level to next higher.
Table 2
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LEVELS
IN ENGINEERING
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LEVELS
IN ENGINEERING
Table
2 shows the results of the comparison between levels. Only one change meets the
standard for tests of significance—the 13.5% increase in idea-oriented RI (shown in red). But this understates
both the difference and its significance.
Graphic 2 (below) separates the VP of
Engineering and the Chief Engineer. It shows that the two positions use very different
kinds of information to do their job. The Chief Engineer’s high commitment to
logical analysis and disciplined execution equips them to technically shepherd the
products of engineering. It also means that they are likely to view issues in
the same manner as the average engineer. They will just do so with more
stringency.
Graphic 2
INFORMATION
PROCESSING PROFILES
VICE PRESIDENT OF
ENGINEERING VERSUS CHIEF ENGINEER
Graphic 3 removes the Chief Engineer from the
Sr. Executive category. With only VPs in the category the percent change from
mid to senior levels jumps from 13% to 22%. The chance that this is just a
random measurement variation jumps from 5 in 100 to one in a 1000. The VP of
engineering clearly has a distinct role in the engineering matrix.
Graphic 3
INFORMATION PROCESSING PROFILES
MID-LEVEL MANAGEMENT VERSUS VP ONLY
INFORMATION PROCESSING PROFILES
MID-LEVEL MANAGEMENT VERSUS VP ONLY
The information a person seeks and accepts
sets the range of possible behaviors. Engineering exhibits more information
consistency than do other professions. Consistency narrows the range of
displayed behaviors. A narrower range increases behavioral similarity. Similar
behaviors tend to evolve into norms. The norms then tend to solidify into
systems of beliefs, values and enforced behaviors. This is the definition of a
culture. That culture constrains deviant elements. This strengthens behavioral
consistency. The result is an extremely
strong culture.
A strong culture has positive and negative
effects. On the positive side it creates a highly efficient environment. Expectations
are aligned. Strategies are understood. Standards of acceptability are well
established.
On the negative side the engineering culture
is keyed to environmental stability. The norms that define a culture are
established patterns of behavior. They are proven over time. That makes them
“sticky.” Change the environment and those norms can become suboptimal or even
dysfunctional. Organizational catalysts can accelerate
the process. And the VP of Engineering is a natural catalyst.
A strong option-generating RI perspective
combined with authority and resources equips the VP to facilitate needed change.
Organizational pockets like R&D and Disaster Recovery can support change
initiatives. The scattering of people in
all functions who maintain a commitment to change-oriented RS and RI styles can
also lend support. Together, these make up engineering’s adjustment mechanisms.
The engineering structure is well-suited to
its mission. It has a strong base of
logically disciplined people supported by a culture that promotes
predictability and quality. A small number of VP level executives, pockets of
variant styles and a scattering of uncommon individuals help keep the
engineering base aligned with the environment. On balance, the internal
structure of engineering is near optimal.
But engineering functions in a social
environment which is comprised of other groups with other functions. How well
it aligns with those functions will influence engineering’s success. The
relative rates of adjustment matter.
EXTERNAL
ORGANIZATIONAL COMPARISONS
How
much engineering differs from other professions is best assessed by comparing
their information processing styles.
Differences would indicate that they are paying attention to different
things, weighting them in a different fashion and/or tending to do different
things with the knowledge. Table 3 compares engineering with a composite of all
of the other professions.
Table 3
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
ENGINEERING AND OTHER PROFESSIONS
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
ENGINEERING AND OTHER PROFESSIONS
Engineering differs from the other
professions by an average of 7.2% across all styles and levels when the
direction of difference is ignored. This
is noticeable but not remarkable. It is
likely to create an awareness “undertow.” A difference is sensed without being
able to pinpoint a cause.
The root cause of the difference can be isolated
by looking at the direction of the differences. Engineers rely less on the RS (spontaneous action) and LP (methodical action) strategies than do
the other professions (red
figures in Table 3).
These styles (RS
and LP)
share an action orientation. Engineers are less inclined to “do” things than
are members of the other professions.
The black figures in Table 3 tell the rest of
the story. Engineers put more emphasis on the HA (analysis) and RI (ideas/innovation) strategies than do their
professional peers. Both are thought based strategies. On average engineers are
about 5.8%
(average HA and RI styles across all levels) more inclined to rely on thought than are
their peers—a noticeable but not striking difference.
Modest
levels of difference mask profound real world effects. Engineering’s structure
and culture require that issues be thought through before acceptance. Thought tends to be a slow invisible
procedure. It looks like nothing is happening. This can be frustrating for
those dependent on engineering for something they need.
”New” is not the issue. Engineers relish assignments involving new products and new endeavors. It is the “how” that is the problematic issue. How is determined by the styles used to interpret reality (see Footnote #5 for elaboration). The engineer’s analytical HA relies on understood patterns. Their methodical LP depends upon established methods of “doing” things. The combinations of these styles establish engineering orthodoxy. And there are a lot of things that can threaten this customary way of doing things. Unfamiliar materials (e.g., nano-materials, micro-fabrication, etc.), new technology (e.g., quantum engineering) and new markets with unfamiliar demands (e.g., internet, globalization) are just some of the current issues affecting the way engineering is done.
”New” is not the issue. Engineers relish assignments involving new products and new endeavors. It is the “how” that is the problematic issue. How is determined by the styles used to interpret reality (see Footnote #5 for elaboration). The engineer’s analytical HA relies on understood patterns. Their methodical LP depends upon established methods of “doing” things. The combinations of these styles establish engineering orthodoxy. And there are a lot of things that can threaten this customary way of doing things. Unfamiliar materials (e.g., nano-materials, micro-fabrication, etc.), new technology (e.g., quantum engineering) and new markets with unfamiliar demands (e.g., internet, globalization) are just some of the current issues affecting the way engineering is done.
Engineering
is less willing than other professions to relax standards. It tends to rely
more on proven methods—both intellectual and physical. It often demands the
full exploration of remote possibilities. The net effect is that engineering is
less flexible in approach than are the other professions. The engineering VP is a key to providing
options that facilitate adaptive changes.
Graphic 4 supports the view that the engineering VP confronts a greater challenge than the VPs in other areas. Engineering VPs are 15% more reliant on RI (p<.05). This suggests that there is something in the engineering job that is not present in their peer groups.
Graphic 4 supports the view that the engineering VP confronts a greater challenge than the VPs in other areas. Engineering VPs are 15% more reliant on RI (p<.05). This suggests that there is something in the engineering job that is not present in their peer groups.
Graphic 4
ENGINEERING VP VERSUS
OTHER PROFESSION VP
(Excludes Chief
Engineer)
MANAGING THE SIDE
EFFECTS
Predictability is a fundamental engineering requirement. People want buildings that stand, cars that
start and lights that work at the flip of a switch. This is best achieved by thinking through
issues (HA) and then executing with precision (LP). Engineering appears to be
ideally suited to its role. Since society’s expectations are unlikely to
change, it is safe to assume that engineering’s optimal posture will be stable
into the future.
Since
the current engineering alignment is both desirable and permanent, it is the
side effects that must be managed. Many negative
side effects involve interactions with other staffs. Graphic 5 identifies some of the inferences that
might be made by these other staffs based on the style consistency of
engineering. It shows engineering’s likely positive and negative attributional
side effects (see Footnote #6 for source reference).
Graphic 5
ILLUSTRATIVE “I OPT”
SNOWFLAKES
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE
ATTRIBUTIONS BY “I OPT” STYLE AND PATTERN
Some likely negative engineering attributions
are located on the bottom vertical axis (HA style) and the lower right diagonal (Conservator pattern) on Graphic 6b (see red arrows). All that is needed
to offset these negative attributions is to occasionally behave in a manner
that confounds the prejudgment.
For example, the last citation on the HA axis (Graphic 6b) is “long winded.”
This attribution arises due to the HA’s tendency to explain matters in complete
detail. Offsetting this would only
require the engineer to occasionally start with their summary conclusion. Detail would only be offered if there is an
expressed interest. This “to the point”
approach would call into question the “long winded” attribution (see Footnote
#7 for added example).
The basic idea is to choose situations and
conditions that have little downside risk. Then address the issue in an
unexpected manner. This need not be done
every time. An occasional display is enough to call into question a negative
prejudgment.
The likely result of the strategy of managing
side effects is to preserve the positive prejudgments (Graphic 6a) while diminishing
the negative attributions (Graphic 6b). The
engineer would be seen as commanding a greater range of options. This would change the calculus on the merits
of including them in a decision.
Engineering’s influence would be expanded to the benefit of all
involved.
MANAGING ADAPTIVE CHANGE
The average engineer’s information processing
election reinforced by the engineering culture makes change a cautious process.
It is the engineering VP that has the authority, available resources and the
idea-based RI style to guide adaption across the engineering organization.
The average engineering VP is well equipped
to handle changes in areas such as manufacturing capabilities, materials
availability or customer requirements. The years spent in navigating the
engineering network while rising to senior status gives them the experience to
handle these kinds of issues. They are less equipped to handle matters that impinge on
engineering from the outside.
Things like changes in workforce (e.g., women
engineers),
changes in corporate policy/procedure (e.g., team organization) or even changes
mandated by unfamiliar technology (e.g. quantum engineering) can require
adjustments that lie outside of traditional engineering experience. Universities
provide this kind of knowledge outside of engineering proper in their MBA and
Executive MBA programs. It is a wise
firm and executive who takes advantage of these programs.
Managing
social change also involves managing existing human assets. Engineers are smart
people. Harnessing them to achieve the many adaptive change objectives is aided
by providing tools compatible with the basic engineering approach. Tools such as “I Opt” TeamAnalysis™ and
LeaderAnalysis™ provide a validated common technology that is tailored to the
specific situation being addressed (see Footnote #7 for tool detail). Equipping
engineering with tools to facilitate adapting to change should be a part of the
engineering toolkit along with things like micrometers, thermometers and
CAD/CAM software. Organizational issues
can be approached with the same measurement and logical rigor as any other
engineering issue.
SUMMARY
Engineers and engineering are unique among the professions. The differences are subtle but real and consequential. Engineering people, structure and culture are well suited to the mission. The issue is to manage the side effects of the strategies being used. A primary exposure is the risk of negative attributions. This can be offset by introducing unexpected, low-risk behaviors. These confound expectations and weaken prejudgments. It is a strategy that benefits all involved.
SUMMARY
Engineers and engineering are unique among the professions. The differences are subtle but real and consequential. Engineering people, structure and culture are well suited to the mission. The issue is to manage the side effects of the strategies being used. A primary exposure is the risk of negative attributions. This can be offset by introducing unexpected, low-risk behaviors. These confound expectations and weaken prejudgments. It is a strategy that benefits all involved.
Another side effect of the engineering organization
is reticence in adapting to changing environmental conditions. Things that
effect how engineering is done can be difficult to assimilate. A key to wise
and prompt adaption is the Vice Presidential level of engineering. The degree of success is likely to be
dependent on the VP’s education in the non-engineering “soft science” of
management.
The availability of organizational tools
compatible with engineering methods is a basic support mechanism. These tools can personally involve all
affected. They are well aligned with the engineering approach. They show the
what, why and how of the recommendations they offer. Making them available to
all involved can equip the engineering organization as a whole to more quickly
adapt at an earlier point.
FOOTNOTES AND
BIBLIOGRAPHY
<1>The “Professional”
row in Table 1 are working engineers in all fields of engineering (i.e., mechanical,
electrical, civil,
etc.). “Level 1 Executive” are supervisory
positions. “Mid-level Executive” include
managers, directors,
general managers and other similar positions. “Senior Executive” consists of Vice
President, Sr. VP and
Executive VPs and includes Chief Engineers.
<2> Salton, Gary (October, 2012). “The Engineering Personality.”
A
textual version can be found on our Research Blog at
http://garysalton.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-engineering-personality.html
A video describing the research can be found on YouTube at
A video describing the research can be found on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jM1yf_7RIfY&feature=youtu.be
It is
also available in the Coffee Break Videos section of www.iopt.com
<3> Salton,
Gary (February 2008).
"I Opt" Strategic
Styles and Patterns.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KVOyznCCWB8
This video provides an orientational overview of
how styles are used to represent information processing
postures. A complete
explanation of the theory and application of the technology is available in a
~17 hour online/telephone certification program conducted on demand by Shannon Nelson
<4> Salton, Gary (April 2014). “Organizational
Rank and Strategic Style”.
This video outlines
the findings of research that relates information processing elections to the
rank of a
person in an organization. It found significant differences by level
and traced the cause back to the
predictability of the issues being addressed
at a particular level.
A
textual version can be found on our Research Blog at
http://garysalton.blogspot.com/2012/10/organizational-rank-and-strategic-styles_22.html
A video describing the research can be found on YouTube at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqeGLvjU2Oc&feature=youtu.be
It is
also available in the Coffee Break Videos section of www.iopt.com.
<5> The underlying concept is that information
determines what can be done. For example, the absence of detail automatically
limits the degree of precision possible. Similarly, the intended output
precludes certain options and favors others. For example, thought oriented
output (i.e.,
plans, evaluations, calculation, interpretation, etc.) impedes simultaneous
action. The interaction of the various postures (both kind and degree) within a group
determines probable group performance.
<6> A battery of I Opt
“snowflakes” that are predictive of observable qualities and which cover
subjects like general behavior, learning, communication, emotional impact,
corporate culture and general culture are available free of charge at http://www.iopt.com/support-materials.html
<7> The first attribution on the negative list of
Graphic 6b—slow--provides another example. This could be offset by making a
spontaneous decision without study or reflection on a matter of minor
consequence. The strategy has little
risk. There is a high probability that
the decision will be the right one, study time is saved and little can be lost
on a minor matter. This decisive
behavior would confound any “slow” attribution.
<8> “I Opt” technology has been used by
universities and corporations in both classroom and workplace settings. In
classroom settings the technology is typically used educational tool to provide
a general framework for understanding human interaction. A variety of reports
addressing issues such as self-discovery, learning, career and sales are used
to support these activities.
In workplace settings “I Opt technology is used to improve performance of existing groups and teams. The tools typically used in this context include:
In workplace settings “I Opt technology is used to improve performance of existing groups and teams. The tools typically used in this context include:
The “I Opt” TeamAnalysis™ report shows a
mechanism for analyzing a team using quantitatively based methods especially
appealing to the exacting standards of engineers. It can be viewed as a video
at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTBlAygPN3g
The “I Opt” LeaderAnalysis™ report views a group from the perspective of the leader in a way that considers the opportunities and exposures inherent in the specific group of people being led. This video offers extensive explanations of analytical technique as well as various supporting graphics and tables that are appealing to engineers. The video can be viewed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1MAbo31e8M&feature=youtu.be
The “I Opt” LeaderAnalysis™ report views a group from the perspective of the leader in a way that considers the opportunities and exposures inherent in the specific group of people being led. This video offers extensive explanations of analytical technique as well as various supporting graphics and tables that are appealing to engineers. The video can be viewed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1MAbo31e8M&feature=youtu.be
The
“I Opt” Emotional Impact Management™ report focuses on controlling the emotions
that a person causes through their interactions. Positive and negative emotions
directly affect the other person’s likely reactions and performance on matters
of common interest. This video can be viewed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HauMxXivyyM
