Showing posts with label information processing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label information processing. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 01, 2019

The Einstein Challenge: American Chemical Society Article Restated

By: Gary J. Salton, PhD, Chief: Research and Development
      Shannon C. Nelson, CEO
      Professional Communications, Inc.

Albert Einstein is said to have held that “If you can’t explain it to a six year old, you don’t understand it yourself.” The following blog tests the authors understanding of their recent American Chemical Society book chapter titled “Gender and Thought Diversity in Chemistry.” We have restated that scholarly article into a form that we believe could be understood by a child. The reader is left to judge whether we have fully met Einstein’s challenge. The paper was published in the Fall 2019 edition of Organization Development Review (Volume 51, Number 4)

THE BIG PICTURE
There is always something wrong in the world. There is a good reason. Culture moves slowly. Culture is the way we treat each other. It is slow to adjust because millions of people have to decide to do about the same things at about the same time.

Technology moves fast. Technology does not have to wait for agreement. It can be deployed as soon as it is discovered or created. If the technology affects how we relate to each other, we can get a problem. For example, it used to take all day to wash a family’s clothes. It took hours to prepare a meal and that had to be done 3 times a day.  There were no vacuum cleaners; it took hours just to sweep and dust. In this world, it made sense to divide up the work—economists call that division of labor—between the husband and wife. One person made the money. The other created a home for everybody to live in.

Then technology changed the world. Suddenly there were lights, washing machines, packaged foods, medicines, cars, airplanes, adding machines and on and on and on. The division of labor that worked well in earlier times no longer made sense. People had to figure out some new way of treating each other. 
 
It takes a lot of time to adjust a culture. Millions and millions of people have to sit around kitchen tables, desks and classrooms and talk. They have to decide what works for them. They also have to think about how what they decide will affect others—their neighbors, work mates and even other citizens. Then somehow all of these individual decisions have to be reconciled—you know, made to fit together.
 
This whole process can take lots of time.  There are millions of people involved. If all you did at school was to count to one million would take you about a month. For you a year is a long time. For culture 50 years is a blink of an eye.  This long process is what is happening in science and engineering.  The change has started but it is far from being done. You and your classmates are the ones who will make the new and better world happen.

THE PROBLEM
Girls are half (50%) of the world population. But only about 13% of engineers are women.  Neither science nor engineering depends on physical ability so differences in strength don’t matter. Boys and girls have about the same brainpower. Both genders can do the job. So why are not there more girls in engineering?

People are pretty good at inventing reasons that something is happening. Girls might say that the boys are keeping them out because they are “pigheaded clouts.”  The boys may say that the girls do not like to do engineering jobs and are not very good at it.  And both the boys and girls can link all of their “reasons” together to create stories. All of these stories, those of both boys and girls, sound like they might be true. The problem is that no one really knows for sure. And figuring out what is really happening can get even harder.

Sometimes if you believe a story you can make it come true. Once upon a time people believed that girls were not good at math. So people discouraged girls from going into it. Fewer girls went into math. That meant that there were fewer girl mathematicians. People then looked at the field of math, saw few women and said “see, girls are not good at math and that is why they are not there.”
 
What happened was that girls faced a “stacked deck” in math. A stacked deck happens when you arrange the cards in a deck so that the chance of a player winning is low. The chance is not zero. Sometimes a player will win. It just will not happen as often as it should. That is what happened in math.

There were a few brave girls who beat the odds. They put up with a lot of bullying from the boys who did not think they should be there. When those brave girls graduated they had a harder time getting a job. When they did get a job it usually was not as good as the ones the boys got. This gave the boys more evidence that “girls were not as good at math.”

What everyone believes is not necessarily true. And there was always evidence that girls were just as good as boys in math. For example, a woman named Julia Robinson solved Hilbert’s Tenth problem—one of the hardest problems in mathematics. And it was important. The future of computer programing depended on it. Julia solved it. She was later elected President of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences as a result. That is one of the highest honors a scientist can get. Girls are just as good at math as are boys.

 And there were other women doing very hard things. A woman named Grace Murray Hopper invented one of the first computer languages—COBOL.  The reason you call a glitch in a computer program a “bug” is because that is what she named it. We all owe a lot to Grace Hopper.

So you can beat a stacked deck. But it is hard. And a lot of girls who could solve hard problems never went into math because of the stories people invented. The fact that the girls were not in math hurt boys, girls, men, women, moms, dads, babies—everyone.

The girls who could have gone into math but did not could have made Artificial Intelligence better. They could have helped nanotechnology make advances faster. Space exploration might be easier. Medical imaging might get better.  Nobody wins when you are playing with a stacked cultural deck. All you are doing is keeping talent away from the problems that it could fix.

We thought that the same thing that happened in math might be happening in Engineering. Lots of people were making up lots of stories about why there were so few women in engineering. Making up stories is easy. We wanted to let the data--facts, statistics, factual input—create a story.  If we did the job right we could be pretty sure that whatever we discovered would be true.

THE KIND OF DATA WE USED
The first thing you have to figure out when you are letting data build a true story is to decide what you are going to collect data on. You have lots of options. You could try to measure emotions—you know; how people feel. Or you might look at the kinds of companies people work for. Or you could try to get data on the family situations of women. The list is endless.  And all these different ways of investigating are legitimate. The issue is whether they will produce a story that we can use to make the world a better place.

We decided to use information processing as our tool for looking at engineering. We figured that whatever was causing the boy-girl discrepancy had to involve how people understood the world that they lived in. And the only way anyone can understand the world is by processing the information that the world provides.

Information processing is pretty simple. People have invented a 3-box model for showing how it works. The model involves identifying the kind of information you look for to address the issue—your input. The kind of thing you are trying to get done—your output. And how you go about connecting your input with your output target—the process you are using.  Here is a picture of the model.



The reason that the model is important is that it sets the kinds of things you can and will do. For example, if you do not notice something you cannot take action based on it. It does not matter how you feel about it. You simply don’t have the input information needed to do anything. 
 
The model can even set how you do something. If you choose to collect detailed input you can be precise. If you gloss over the detail you will not have the information that precision usually requires. Lots of other things are also set by the kind of information you choose to search out for and accept.

What you intend to do with your input information—your output—also affects how you do things. You might choose to plan a course of action before doing anything. Or you might just choose to act based on what you think might work. If you choose to plan, it will take time and effort.  If you choose to act without a plan you will probably be faster but the result will be less certain.
 
When you got up this morning you chose the clothes you are wearing. How did you do that? When you got to school you might have chosen to go right to your seat instead of talking to someone. Why?  These are decision we make all of the time. You make thousands of these kinds of decisions every day. If we had to think about every one of them we would never get anywhere.  We get around this problem by figuring out standard ways of doing things. We reuse ways of doing things that have worked for us in the past. This is our “process” box working. It is just the pattern we use to connect our input and output.

The information processing model works for you as an individual. But it also affects how other people see you and treat you. For example, if you choose to use your input to plan other people will probably would not see a lot of action. Planning is mostly a thinking kind activity.

People watching you cannot see your thinking. They would not see much happening. It could be easy for them to think you are disinterested. The same kind of thing could happen if you choose to use your input for action. People watching you might judge you to be careless or reckless even if all that you were trying to do was to fix the issue quickly.

The reason people watch what you are doing is that it affects them. What you do can help or hinder this other persons goals. They watch what you do and make attributions on what you are likely to do in the future. Attributions are just little stories that we use to figure out what people are likely to do in the future. They might be true or might not. No one really knows. But we use them anyhow because we have to. What we do affects other people. What they do affects us. It is only smart to be able to know what to expect. Attributions do not have to be right all of the time. They just have to be right more than they are wrong most of the time.

So, we knew what kind of information we needed to try to answer the question of why there are so few girls in engineering. The next question was to figure out how we could measure things in order to get that information.

HOW WE USED “I OPT” TO MEASURE THINGS
We have developed a tool that can measure your information processing choices. It is called “I Opt”. Using it we can figure out how you are likely to approach new issues you face. We can also figure out what other people are likely to think about you as you make those choices.

We do not know exactly what you or anyone else will actually do. What we do know is just how you are likely to go about making that choice. That is enough to tell us a lot about what is going to happen in a particular situation. Engineering is a situation where people have to work together to get something done. Knowing how people are likely to work together can help us figure out what is going on in that situation.

 “I Opt” only works for grown-ups.  At your age you can choose to be anything you want to be. But sometime between now and when you are fully grown you will probably choose an information processing approach. You will probably choose an approach that works most of the time in the kind of job you choose to do. A fireman has to pay attention to different things than does a brain surgeon. There are lots of different kinds of jobs. They need lots of different approaches to do them right. There is no one right way to do things.

Our “I Opt” tool works to measure these different approaches. We had to make sure that it measured things right. We wanted to be sure that we were not using a rubber ruler. We did this through a process called validation. A lot of smart people in statistics figured out eight tests to be sure that a ruler really works. “I Opt” passed all of the tests. It is kind of like testing your knowledge of mathematics.  If you get all of the answers right the teacher can be pretty sure you know the subject.

Next we needed to figure out how we were going to apply our “I Opt” measuring tool.  It is impossible to talk to everybody. So we used what is called a sample. A sample is just a piece of the thing you are trying to measure.  It is kind of like when you go to the ice cream shop. They might give you a taste of a particular flavor. That is a sample. You use it to figure out if you want a whole ice cream cone made out of it.

We did the same kind of thing with our measurements.  But our sample was a lot bigger.  We got thousands of people to tell us how they process information. To do that we used a survey.  Our survey is just a bunch of questions. We use the answers to measure input and output and then we figure out how people connect them—the process. 
 
This way of doing things gave us a pretty big sample—kind of like getting a big scoop of ice cream to taste instead of just a little spoonful. That made us pretty certain that it would tell us what the whole thing—engineering in our case—was really like. 
 
So, we had a question—why aren’t there more girls in engineering. We had a measuring tool—“I Opt” technology. And we had a bunch of people—both men and women—who could act as a sample.  The next thing to do is to actually apply our tools in the real world of actual people.

WHAT WE FOUND OUT
What we discovered is that the question of why there are so few girls in engineering is not easy to answer. The first thing we had to do was to figure out what was involved in doing engineering. We found out that doing engineering is pretty much a thinking kind of job. Engineers spend a lot of time figuring out all the things that might happen. Then they figure out the kinds to things that they can do if those things really do happen.
 
We have a name for the kind of approach you have to use to do that kind of job. We call it “Hypothetical Analyzer.” The things that might happen are called hypothesis in the grown up world. Figuring out what to do with them is called analysis. That is how we came up with the name. In fact, that is how most names in science are created. They describe what you are talking about.

So at the end we knew what engineers did. We then had to figure out if there were any differences between men and women –boys and girls when they were your age—who work in engineering. We found that both men and women depended on thinking through things through before acting. Men and women engineers do engineering in about the same way most of the time. This main way of doing engineering cannot be the cause of why there are so few women in engineering. The same cause—scientists call this a variable—cannot explain a difference in a result.
.
We call the way people do things most of the time their primary style. But nothing works all of the time for everything. We all have the ability to use all of the different approaches to a problem—we all can plan, act decisively, be creative or follow procedures exactly. But we also tend to favor one or the other of these approaches as our second choice. We named this fallback option our secondary style—a clever name, don’t you think?

When we looked at the secondary styles in our sample we found a difference between men and women engineers. Not a big difference but one what would be noticed as men and women worked together solving engineering problems. The difference was about 10%.  In other words, men and women would disagree on the right secondary approach one time in every ten.
 
More men than women would choose an experimental “let’s give it a try” approach.  More women than men in engineering would prefer to solve the problem using a way that they already knew would probably work. The men’s way might work better but it has a greater risk of failure. The women’s way is more certain but does not have the possibility of a big improvement.

Who is right? Which way is better? It is a silly question. It’s like asking if apples are better than peaches. Both are good. Both are fruit. You can be equal and still be different. 
 
The choice of the “best” fruit to eat has no consequence beyond the eating. If you choose an apple this time you can still choose a peach the next. In the case of engineering the story is different. The small differences that occasionally happen can affect the future. These disagreements can cause people to make attributions. You remember—attributions are just little stories about why something happens.
 
The men engineers want to try new things—not all of the men, just some of them. The women engineers want to use what they know already work—not all of them, just some. The men who want to try new things “attribute” the choice of the women who disagree with them as “because” they are less creative. The women are rejecting the creative option because they believe they have a better one. But the fact that it is not true does not matter to the attribution. The ten percent of the women involved really did reject the creative option. This gives the men involved “evidence” that the attribution is true.

Just as happened in math, if you believe a story you can make it come true. There are about 87 men for every 13 women in engineering. The few men who have been affected by the disagreement have a lot of other men to talk to about women’s creativity. If only a few of these other men believe the story those men can talk to still other men. It is kind of like a relay race. Every time the story is passed more people come to believe it. Sooner or later “everyone” comes to accept the story. The attribution has been made to “come true.”

The attribution has an effect. Women trying to enter engineering are treated as if they were inferior—less able to do the job. A tone of condescension—a kind of snobbery—is adopted by the men. Women are tolerated but not welcomed. Women looking at this judge the condition as not good for them. They start looking elsewhere for jobs. Fewer women go into engineering as a career. The men look at the situation as “proving” that women are not as good as men in engineering. The same thing as happened in math could be happening today in engineering.

Engineering ended up at the bottom of the pile in its share of women. Almost every other profession has more women than does engineering. Those other jobs can be just as tough as engineering. It is not the engineering job keeping women out.  It has something to do with the way women are being treated within engineering. Our study suggests that that “something” is the false attributions—those little stories—that men engineers tell each other.

TESTING OUR CONCLUSIONS
Our initial study made some sense. However, we also knew that sometimes things that seem to make sense turn out to be wrong. So we decided to test our thinking by comparing chemical engineering to chemical science. Choosing to compare chemical engineering to chemical science cancels out a lot of “reasons” used to support any negative attributions being made in chemical engineering.

Both chemical science and engineering use the same kind of knowledge. They both require about the same kind of education. They both work with the same kinds of tools. The only difference is that engineers tend to produce “things” while scientists produce knowledge—the how and why things work as they do.

But there is another big difference. Chemical science has a lot more women. There are about 34% of women in the chemical science workforce.  Chemical engineering has only 17% women—more than for engineering as a whole but still very low. Engineering is still at the bottom of the pile.  We compared the women in both science and engineering and found that they were identical in the way they processed information. Whatever was causing the difference in participation we knew that it was not in the kind of women who were going into the two fields.

Then we compared the men. The men in both chemical engineering and chemical science had the same primary style. They both used the thinking Hypothetical Analyzer approach.  But when their primary thinking approach did not work a difference appeared. The men scientists tended to rely more on an experimental “let’s give this a try” as their secondary approach. The men engineers tended to rely more on trusted methods that worked in the past. And this can make a big difference in the kind of attributions people make.

The greater reliance on the experimental approach makes it easier for men scientists to accept differences in opinion on what should be done. For the chemical scientist the women’s greater use of trusted methods is just another option. Not right or wrong, just different. There is no need for the men to make attributions to help defend their position. A stream of different ideas and options are just the ordinary way things get done science.

The acceptance of different approaches as being equally valuable means that the atmosphere in science is more favorable to women. As a result twice as many women choose chemical science rather than chemical engineering. This finding tends to confirm the major part of our study of engineering. It is not engineering that is driving women away. It is probably the false narrative—the untrue story—that is doing the job.

CONCLUSION
Does our study “prove” women are staying out of engineering because of false attributions? No but we can be pretty sure that at least some women are not going into engineering because of the attitudes of the men in the field. Those attitudes are at least in part due to the attributions that have been made in the past about women’s engineering abilities.

Our study also tells what is likely to happen in the future. As more and more young women enter engineering the attribution stories the older men are telling each other will start falling apart. Just as happened with Julia Robinson in math, it is hard to ignore talent when it has been given a chance to be displayed. The more women that enter engineering, the more women will get a chance to show what they can do.

What we old guys can do is to try to make it as easy as we can for young women to get into engineering. This study is part of that effort. Our comparison of chemical science and engineering has shown that women can be as successful in engineering as in any other field. We have also shown how little differences can be used to build an attribution that can then be made to “come true” simply by being believed.  That attribution will fall apart as more and more women enter engineering. They can do the job just as well as men. That talent will show. As it does the attribution stories will crumble—fast.

The story told by this study is a good one. The problems found were not structural. They are an artifact built on a weak foundation. The ball is already rolling to fix the issue of low participation of women in engineering. Women, men, boys, girls—everybody—are  going to be better off in the future as this issue moves from a current problem to a footnote of history.

Tuesday, July 18, 2017

Information Technology: How Different are We?



An earlier evidence-based study (see footnote #1 for reference) showed that Senior IT executives differed significantly from their peers in other functions. The cause was traced to the unique nature of the job being done.  This study expands on that research to quantitatively discover just how different IT is from other organizational functions.

This evidence-based research samples 3,673 IT people from all levels (Sr. executives, mid-management, professional staffs). It compares these people to 44,448 non-IT people from similar levels in other organizational functions. The study found statistically significant differences that show IT is in a natural leadership position.

The differences found are not great. This is seen as a positive. IT leadership can be exercised while preserving a common culture and with minimal dysfunctional turmoil.  The study provides evidence that IT departments in diverse firms are more alike than different. This means that the IT discipline as a whole is likely to exhibit a consistently positive leadership momentum across the various industries in which IT participates.

The study found that IT people were more different from each other internally than IT is externally different from other non-IT functions. Finally, the study compared IT to engineering. It found a near identity in approach. It also found that this identity was due to IT women.   IT men were substantially different from their male engineering counterparts. 


Video Link
A companion video both expands and abbreviates this research.  You can access this YouTube video from our website at www.iopt.com or by clicking the icon on the right to go directly to the YouTube video.


1. THE SAMPLE
The current study draws its evidence from a sample of 3,673 people in Information Technology at all levels from senior management to non-management professionals.  These were contrasted to a database of 44,488 non-IT respondents who occupy similar organizational levels. The database contains subsections divided by organizational rank, job titles and gender.  The individual charts and tables used here contain citations of the sample sizes of the subsections of the database applied to a particular segment of the analysis.

The proportion of males and females was tested. It proved to be reasonably close to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 46.8% estimate for total female workforce participation and the 25.5% estimate for women in computer related professions (see Footnote #2 for reference). Overall, the sample appears to be reasonably representative of the IT and non-IT professional populations. 


2. THE RESEARCH TOOLS
The work content of IT and non-IT functions will be different. Every functional area must adopt an information processing strategy suited to its mission. They must pay attention to particular inputs. A specific character of output will be targeted. And a unique mechanism (i.e., process) is needed to connect the input used with that of the output issued. This approach is instantly recognizable as the classical engineering model of input-process-output. This is the principal tool used in this research.

Image 1
THE BASIC MODEL



The measurement applied to the classical model is “I Opt” technology. Central to its vocabulary is the concept of strategic style. This refers to specific combinations of input-process-output that are repeatedly used in the conduct of life (see Footnote #3 for validity and effectiveness citations).  Table 1 outlines the major variables used in “I Opt” technology. It does not summarize the theory (i.e., what causes what and why) underlying “I Opt” technology. It merely provides a simplified orientation.

Table 1
ILLUSTRATIVE CHARACTERIZATION OF STRATEGIC STYLES
 


Styles define the way a person interprets the world. The way a person “interprets” the world affects the behavior that we see in each other. A practical example demonstrates the connection. A person focused on detailed input automatically restricts the decision horizon. Detail grows exponentially the farther one looks into the future.  At some point it overwhelms the finite human mind. A future beyond that point cannot be “seen” (see footnote #4 for fuller description of style generated behaviors). A person who is not confined by a demand for detail faces no such restriction. Different strategies endow people with different capabilities.

The principal measurement tools applied to the styles in Table 1 styles are standard statistical tests. A two-tail t-test assuming unequal variances is used to determine if the groups being compared are really different or just random measurement variations of the same population. This is a trusted and conservative tool for judging differences between groups.

GRAPHIC 1
ILLUSTRATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
 

Graphic 1 is a visualization of the testing procedure.  The graph defines the level of commitment of two samples (red and blue lines).  They are very similar in structure. The statistical t-test tells us that we can be 99.9% certain that the two groups are really different.  In other words, the two graphs are not just wiggles in the level of commitment of the same population that was sampled twice. Rather, they are two different populations superimposed on each other. The average person in each group interprets the world in a somewhat different way.




3. HOW IT COMPARES TO ALL OTHER FUNCTIONS
Every functional area does different things. All of them have access to all four styles cited in Table 1 (i.e., different mixes of input, process, and output).  If the difference in style elections is too large coordination issues will begin to arise.  If the difference is too little, they could miss important variables that they should consider (e.g., everyone sees blue trees because they are all wearing blue glasses.) 

The style strengths combining all organizational levels of IT (n=3,673) and Non-IT (n=44,498) were compared. The use of the opportunistic RS style showed no difference. The three remaining styles showed highly significant differences (99%+ confidence that the difference is not due to measurement variation).  This tells us that the differences are structural. These differences will reappear if we were to repeat the test on a different sample.  But it does not tell us how much they are different.

Comparing the average strength of commitment tells us that these “real” differences are not strong. Graphic 2 shows the greatest measured difference—a variation of 7% on average.  A consistent group of IT people place a low reliance on the LP scale (see ‘A”) while an equally consistent number of non-IT people rely to a greater degree on that style (see “B”). 


GRAPHIC 2
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF LP STYLE
ALL LEVELS OF IT vs. ALL LEVELS NON-IT



Graphic 3 (below) shows that IT also has a structural difference in the two intellectually based styles. IT has a 2% stronger commitment to the analytical HA style and a 4% higher allegiance to the idea oriented RI style than do their non-IT counterparts. 

GRAPHIC 3
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF HA AND RI STYLES
ALL LEVELS OF IT vs. ALL LEVELS NON-IT
 


These differences are small but “real.” They are not large enough to be explicitly recognized. But they are likely to be sensed over repeated interactions. They will enter into our evaluations of each other. IT’s stronger analytical HA and idea oriented RI postures tend to be highly valued in modern firms. They are likely to become a basis for a little differential respect. This respect is can act as an inducement for new entrants to elect IT over other functions. It is a good thing.

A natural tendency is to see differences and ignore similarities. It is worth noting the area under the curves. About ±90% of the people in both IT and Non-IT occupy a position in this area. This means that most people in both areas will tend to view the world through roughly the same lens. This commonality is what gives rise to a corporate culture.  A common culture is what allows large, complex organizations to exist over time.


4. HOW IT COMPARES TO OTHER FUNCTIONS BY ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL
Section 3 describes how the IT function as a whole is likely to be perceived by the organization as a whole.  However, interactions between IT and other functions tend to occur at similar organizational levels. It is worth examining these individual levels.

IT senior management level differs significantly from other areas in only one dimension—the idea-oriented RI style by about 8% (95.2% confidence that the difference is real). They are likely to be viewed as forward thinking contributors by their peers.

Mid-management (managers and directors) is a different story.  They differ significantly (99.99% confidence) from their non-IT peers by registering 10% less in the opportunistic action RS style and by 5% less in the methodical action LP style. These are both action oriented styles. This posture will tend to position IT mid-management as being a bit slow out of the blocks in the opinion of other functions. As a group they are unlikely to be seen as having a sense of urgency.

The situation changes once again when Professional (non-management) levels are considered. Like mid-management the professional level registers a highly significant 8% less inclination toward methodical execution LP style. However, they have a 3% greater tendency (99.4% confidence) to use the analytical HA strategy and a 6% greater predisposition toward the idea-oriented RI (99.99% confidence). The people working in the trenches are likely to be seen as innovative thinkers by their non-IT peers,

The magnitude of the style differences described above can be visualized by graphing the distributions. Graphic 4 shows the distribution of IT and Non-IT professionals by style.


GRAPHIC 4
STYLE STRENGTH DISTRIBUTION: IT vs. NON-IT PROFESSIONALS


The red shaded areas show where IT exceeds non-IT in strength. The blue shaded area is where non-IT exceeds IT.  Notice the consistency across the range of style strengths (i.e., the solid blue and red colored areas). This is what the “significance test” is picking up. The statistics are telling us that the difference represents two unique and different curves being superimposed on each other. They are not just wiggles in the same curve. The direction and amount of the average difference is indicated by the arrow and percentage figure.

Overall IT is a bit different than its non-IT counterparts. The idea-generating RI style remains the signature characteristic of IT.  Senior IT management will be seen as sponsoring and supporting new initiatives.  Professional IT will be seen generating options and alternatives at a higher than expected rate.  Mid-management will be viewed as quelling the implementation a bit but not at a rate that would be threatening to the mission.

The overall story told by the global analysis of IT versus other functions remains intact. IT is likely to have an overall positive image regardless of the level upon which it is approached. This likely translates into an ease of recruitment and higher retention probabilities. IT fits well as a leader in the matrix of the various organizational functions.

5. HOW WE DIFFER FROM OTHER IT GROUPS
Virtually every IT group with whom we deal thinks of themselves as unique among their peers. In one sense this is probably true. Every IT group has a somewhat unique central objective (e.g., dependability vs innovation), relies on rather different tools (e.g., C++, Python, Java, etc.) and runs a different mix of applications.

However, what is really at issue is the underlying capacity of the group.  People maintaining their uniqueness are likely to be referring to is their capacity to respond quickly (RS), innovate more aggressively (RI), provider deeper insight into issues (HA) or to execute with greater precision (LP).  This understanding can be tested with hard data.

The sample database included in 12 IT firms and one Research University where the sample of IT group members was large enough to statistically test all four “I Opt” style dimensions. This produced at total of 312 points at which a difference could occur (see footnote #5 for a table based visualization). Each of these points was tested for statistical significance. The academic standard of 95% or more certainty that the difference is “real” (i.e., structural in the sense that it is likely to repeat over multiple tests) was used as the significance cutoff.

Applying the academic standard to the data revealed that the average IT unit will find itself using a different strategic style than another IT unit about 29% of the time; 71% of the time they will discover the other IT unit is approaching issues in the about same manner as they do. This statistic is notable. But it just speaks to the occurrence of a difference, not to its direction or size.

When 29% difference is encountered it is likely to average about 15.9% in strength. However, Graphic 5 shows that this average is a composite of very different style strengths.

GRAPHIC 5
IT UNIT STYLE STRENGTH DIFFERENCE
 



Thought-based (i.e., intellectual) idea-generating RI and analytical HA styles are less than half as strong as the action-based RS (opportunistic action) and LP (methodical action) styles. When differences in the thought-based strategies are encountered, they are likely to be of a nuanced rather than an “in your face” variety.

Graphic 5 shows that the action based differences are not only more powerful but they are likely to be encountered more frequently. These styles are likely to center on “how” work is done (i.e., RS and LP action styles) rather that “what” is being done (i.e., the more intellectual RI and HA styles). “How” is easier to see than “what.” This notice-ability helps to explain why IT groups tend to think of themselves as “unique.”  These “in your face” differences are much easier to see than are the commonalities. But in reality, commonalities are the more distinctive characteristic of IT groups.


8. HOW DIFFERENT IS THE PROFESSIONAL STAFF MIX
IT professional staff is a composite many different functions. An incomplete sampling of the diversity of titles from our database is provided in Table 2. The commonality running through all of the IT titles is the general focus on computers, programming and/or networks. However, how the way that common content is applied can differ markedly.



Table 2
SAMPLING OF TITLE DIVERSITY: IT PROFESSIONALS
 



Our earlier Organizational Rank and Strategic Styles (see footnote #6 for reference) study provides a tool to be used to sort out various groups. That study included a “stress test” which showed strategic style variation within a single organizational rank was predictable from the character of work content. This study builds on that concept to create Feedback Horizon categories. The Feedback Horizon represents the speed at which an organization can be assured that the work effort has been successful (see footnote #7 for an elaboration of the Feedback concept). Table 3 applies the Feedback Horizon to the job titles in our database.

Table 3
CATEGORIZATION OF IT PROFESSIONAL STAFFS
 
 
Table 3 internal consistency was tested using a sampling strategy.  A sample of 88 comparisons between specific job titles yielded 3 individual styles where there was a significant difference (3.4% of the 88 sample).  Two of these occurred in the Medium Term and one in the Short Term categories.  Overall, the internal consistency was judged to be adequate for the purposes at hand.

The second criterion is that the groups have to be different form each other. The left column of Table 4 displays the results of that test. Only a single medium term horizon group’s RS style category (see yellow highlight in Table 4) failed to reach academic statistical significance (+95% chance that the groups are truly different from each other). The single difference is judged to be tolerable in the context of this study.  The groups are different from each other.
 
Table 4
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE BETWEEN IT GROUPS
 


A certification of difference does not speak to the degree of that difference. The right hand column in Table 4 is the difference in average strength for each style. The absolute difference average (i.e., the direction of difference is ignored) of all of the individual differences is 19.4%.  This is larger than the differences between IT and other functional areas.

GRAPHIC 6
FEEDBACK CATEGORY STYLE PROFILES


Graphic 6 is a visualization of the differences in the individual styles. The structure of the lines follows results obtained in an earlier, larger study of style-job relationships (see previously cite footnote #6 for reference).  This cross-confirmation tends to lend credibility to both studies.

The downward sloping analytical HA and action-based LP styles both rely on predictability to be effective.  Both draw on predefined “maps” (i.e., patterns) to guide their work. The accuracy and value of these “maps” declines as the Feedback Horizon lengthens. In the real world time always introduces unexpected variables. These accumulate and will compromise any predefined strategy—intellectual (HA) or operational (LP).

The same logic explains the increasing value of the option-generating RI and opportunistic RS styles as the Feedback Horizon lengthens.  Neither requires any kind of predetermined pattern.  This increases their value as the time between action and feedback lengthens. New unexpected variables can be treated as opportunities rather than obstacles.

The “take home” from this section is that the components of IT’s professional staff are more different from each other than is IT different from the other functions. This is no accident of the IT functions history.  It is built into the nature of the jobs being done at the professional level. It is here today and it will be here tomorrow. The managerial challenge is permanent.

This analysis offers some directional guidance for IT management. It tells management that they will have to invest in people if they want to create a career ladder for all involved.  Strategic styles can change over time. Those that want to advance up the hierarchical ladder need to be provided with the opportunity to develop competence in the styles appropriate to the targeted level.

Another element of guidance is that management must make an investment in developing a common strategy that all elements of the IT workforce can “buy into.”  This will not be easy.  It will take more than writing a memo or a publishing a statement of purpose. It will require interacting with people who see the world in different way and have different expectations.

IT will probably function at some level of competence even if nothing is done. Everyone has access to all four styles. It is likely that no one wants failure and they will eventually access the style appropriate to the issue rather than just relying on personal preference. However, if management can harness the diverse power of all four styles, outstanding results move from possible to probable to the inevitable.





 9. ARE WE DIFFERENT THAN ENGINEERING?
Electrical engineering gave birth to information technology. IT is fond of pointing to this common heritage. Engineering and IT share many common intellectual and operational tools. But everyone that uses a wrench is not a mechanic. It is worthwhile to see whether both fields share common strategic styles (i.e., issue understanding) when pursuing their work.  Table 5 suggests that this may be, in fact, the case.

Table 5
PROFESSIONAL LEVEL IT VERSUS
PROFESSIONAL LEVEL ENGINEERING
(IT more + or less – than Engineering)


At a functional level there is no significant difference between the issue resolution approach of IT and engineering on any “I Opt” style dimension.  However, if we dig a bit deeper we find that this identity of perspective has an unexpected foundation.

Table 6 compares females in IT versus females in engineering. The single difference is in the RS style (opportunistic action) and that difference only reaches marginal significance levels. For practical purposes the same kind of women are being attracted to both professions.

Table 6
PROFESSIONAL LEVEL IT FEMALES VERSUS
PROFESSIONAL LEVEL ENGINEERING FEMALES
(IT more + or less – than Engineering)
 


The story is different when IT males are compared to males in engineering. Table 7 shows that males in IT and engineering differ significantly on all four style dimensions. IT is drawing in different kinds of men than is Engineering.


Table 7
PROFESSIONAL LEVEL IT MALES VERSUS
PROFESSIONAL LEVEL ENGINEERING MALES
(IT more + or less – than Engineering)


Table 7 shows that IT males have significantly less LP (-6%) and HA (-3%) than do engineering males. If IT were to consist entirely of males it would mean less performance consistency, less planning and less diligence than that displayed in engineering.

Table 7 also shows that IT males have appreciably more RS (+7%) and RI (+5%) strength than does engineering. In a world of entirely male IT personnel this would mean more errors, more adequacies instead of excellence and more chaos than that now experienced.

But there is a good side. The lower level of structured styles (LP and HA) and the higher levels of the more opportunistic strategies (RS and RI) make IT more open to new options.  Graphic 7 shows that IT has over twice engineering’s level of female participation (27% versus 13%).  In effect, the very condition that would distinguish IT from engineering (male style profiles) may be the reason it is able to attract more women who then level the information processing playing field with engineering.

GRAPHIC 7
WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT IN STEM OCCUPATIONS
1970 TO 2011





Both the LP and HA styles use a structured strategy in conducting life. Structured approaches rely on predefined patterns—norms, rules, formulas, conventions, etc. These patterns tend to be interwoven.  A change in one can require changes in others. This interdependency makes change difficult. The fact that IT males have less commitment to structured strategies makes it a bit easier to accept change—including changes in the female workforce composition.

Another plus for the IT males accent toward the unpatterned RI and RS styles is it furthers IT’s position of organizational leadership. The new ideas and responsive action is leavened by a strong female commitment to consistency, dependability and precise execution.  The combination produces an organizational leadership profile that is forward leaning without be so strong as to be out of range for the remainder of the organization.

In summary, IT is on target in claiming a kinship with engineering.  But that kinship is built on a mix of strategic styles very different from that of its engineering brethren. That mix, along with a broader range of responsibilities, allows IT to assume a more prominent role in setting organizational direction.



9. CONCLUSION
IT sits in an advantageous position at this juncture of business history.  It is responsible for the tools that will be key to the future direction of any organization.  It is favorably structured in terms of the way that it approaches issues.  Its higher RI strength insures that it will be prepared to offer new ideas and options to meet challenges as they arise.

IT’s overall style strength profile is well suited to its mission. Its RI strength is not so high as to be “out of range” of the functions with which it must interact. IT’s structured approach is sufficiently disciplined to handle the rigorous demands of technology that it commands. In final analysis, IT is different from other functions but not so different as to be dysfunctional.

The organizational challenge of IT is internal. The variety of information processing postures held by its staffs mean that expectations and capabilities vary widely.  The internal challenge is two-fold.  IT management must develop coherent strategies that can positively engage the variety of people involved.  That will require considerable and continuing work by the leaders of the various IT functions.

The other challenge is to source and develop the staffs who will become future leaders. Finding and attracting women who are better aligned with the strategic profiles of the male component of IT is one possible step. It could vastly increase the IT resource pool. But on a broader level, everyone in IT would benefit from a management program that helps all groups within IT develop their strategic style talents in a way that benefits them as well as the organization as a whole.  That “soft side” managerial talent capacity is probably the scarcest commodity in the current IT organizations.
 



FOOTNOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.    Salton, Gary J., 2017.  Information Technology: Senior Executive Organizational “Fit”:   Evidence-based measurements are used to determine the overall standing of senior IT executives versus other senior executives. “I Opt” technology was applied to extend a Deloitte Consulting (2015) study. It showed that IT satisfaction directly related to information processing profile overlaps between the levels. Predictable points and degrees of tension could be identified.  The study also measured the overall fit between 147 senior IT executives with 1,511 non-IT VP’s identifying specific points of opportunity and exposure.
Text Research Blog: http://garysalton.blogspot.com/2017/03/information-technology-senior-executive.html
Video (15 minutes): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0PHvPIR6rVU&feature=youtu.be
2.    United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Feb 8, 2017. Table 11. Employed persons by detailed occupation, sex, race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity. Accessed April 6, 2017: https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.htm

3.  “I OPT” VALIDATION:  “I Opt” technology has been extensively validated both in terms of theory and operation.  The major publications on the subject include:
a)    A book has been published which covers all eight accepted tests of validity is available from Professional Communications at a modest cost. The book is available free of charge at the Organizational Engineering website at:  http://www.oeinstitute.org/articles/validity-study.html. An included resume outlines the extensive professional qualifications of the author.
     Soltysik Robert (2000), Validation of Organizational Engineering: Instrumentation and Methodology, Amherst: HRD Press. 

 A doctoral dissertation titled A Study of Intuition in Decision-Making using Organizational Engineering Methodology was approved by Nova Southeastern University in 2000. The dissertation used “I Opt” as both a subject and research instrument. The dissertation was subject to review by an independent doctoral research committee headed by a Ph.D. focused on research methods and found to meet all academically accepted standards of validity. The complete dissertation is available free of charge at   http://www.oeinstitute.org/articles/ashley-fields.html.

The dissertation is also available in book form as: Fields, Ashley (2001). The Effects of Intuition in Decision-Making,
ISBN-13: 978-3639368185, Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller (August 18, 2011). Available from Amazon.com.


b)    “I Opt” Style Reliability Stress Test: A sample of 171 surveys applied a classic test-retest design covering a period of 18 years to test the reliability of the “I Opt” instrument on styles (i.e., short term decision responses). The results far exceed the reliability of traditional instruments (i.e., MBTI, DiSC, Firo-B, 16PF). The research is available of the Google research blog in textual form at: http://garysalton.blogspot.com/2011/03/i-opt-style-reliability-stress-test.html. 
 A 10-minute video of the study is available on YouTube at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vs6eoIsqVkc

c)    “I Opt” Pattern Reliability Stress Test: The same data as used for style reliability was applied to patterns (i.e., long-term decision sequences). The change between test-retest was found to be negligible. The research is available of the Google research blog in textual form at: http://garysalton.blogspot.com/2011/03/i-opt-pattern-reliability-stress-test.html.
 A 15-minute video of the study is available on YouTube at:
     https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0SLg28BhNHU

d)    Operationally “I Opt” has been validated through continued worldwide use at all levels from hourly work force to Board of Director levels of Fortune 50 organizations in the profit, non-profit and government sectors. An outdated (last updated 15 years ago) listing of the organizations involved can be found at http://www.iopt.com/corporate-information.html.  Many of the clients cited have continued to use the technology for decades and many more pages of new clients could be added if the list were to be updated to today.
 
4.    The underlying concept is that information determines what can be done. For example, the absence of detail automatically limits the degree of precision possible. Similarly, any intended output precludes certain options and favors others. For example, thought oriented output (i.e., plans, evaluations, calculation, interpretation, etc.) impedes spontaneous action. The interaction of the various postures (both kind and degree) within a group determines probable group performance.










The table is a simplified outline intended to convey the general principles underlying “I Opt” technology. It is NOT the theoretical foundation of “I Opt.” A more complete exposition of the concepts and construction of strategic styles is provided in the “Team Tension – Causes and Management” beginning about 2 minutes into the video. This can be accessed at:
YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xQ_5b4BUUB0&feature=youtu.be
Google Research Blog: http://garysalton.blogspot.com/2013/01/team-tension-causes-and-management.html


5.    Significance tests were run on every possible combination of the 13 organizations. These were posted to a standard matrix. Each style offered 78 potential points of difference.  All four styles produce 78 x 4 = 312 total points at which a difference can occur.


6.    Salton, Gary J., 2012.  Organizational Rank and Strategic Styles  A study of 10,617 executives from 1,559 different organizations disclosed a systematic, statistically significant relationship between “I Opt” Strategic Styles and organizational rank. This condition is caused by a single factor that is an inherent quality in any organization. This factor, in combination with corollary conditions, sets the value of each style at various organizational levels. This value then becomes effective in hiring and promotional decisions. The net result is a tendency for people at a particular organizational level to share a common information processing perspective.
7.    The Organizational Rank and Strategic Styles study (above) identified predictability as the factor determining whether a particular strategic style was favored at the various organizational levels.  A “stress test” showed that this factor also could be applied to work content characteristics to various jobs at a single level. Within a single organizational level predictability works through the agencies of opportunity, incentive, and resolution.  All of these factors are correlated to the speed at which work provides feedback on the adequacy of the effort.

The “feedback” in question is NOT the speed of reaction of interim efforts
(e.g., whether code works or not). Rather “feedback horizon” is defined as the speed at which the organization surrounding the IT worker is able to definitively recognize that work as a successful contribution to the organization.  That recognition is what determines the fate of the person doing the job.