Engineering Leadership

By: Gary J. Salton, Ph.D., Chief R&D and CEO
Professional Communications, Inc.

SUMMARY
This research blog shows that all levels of engineering share a consistency in their information processing (i.e., “I Opt” strategic style) approach. The research also discovered statistically significant style differences based on rank. The blog gives direction on how engineering development can leverage these differences into more effective leadership at an earlier point.


THE SAMPLE
The “I Opt” scores for 456 professional engineers were drawn from the “I Opt” database. These were divided into 3 categories. The Vice President category consisted of 44 people from 24 different firms. These people carried the title of EVP, Sr.VP, VP or Chief Engineer.

The Manager category consisted of 102 people taken from 41 different firms. They typically carried the title of Manager or Director. They were drawn from a variety of engineering areas. The subfields include mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, chemical, civil, process and a host of others.

The Professional category consisted of 310 people from 62 different firms. Titles vary widely. They include prefixes such as senior, research, design, project, process, industrial and many other kinds of engineering.

Table 1 summarizes the source data. The size, diversity and multiple firms involved suggests that sample is a reasonable estimate of the engineering as a whole. It probably can be trusted as representative of the field.

Table 1
PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER SAMPLE

SHORT-TERM DECISION MAKING
People have information processing preferences. They choose different inputs, favor different outputs and have different strategies to get from input to output. No one is completely objective in choosing the processing method they use. They normally have a standard starting point and move forward from there. If we had to decide on how to decide every decision, nothing would get done. Adopting a conventional starting point is a necessary part of life.

“I Opt” refers to basic information processing approaches as strategic styles. These are the short-term decision strategies. People use a particular starting point because it works in the environment within which they live. The discipline of engineering has a consistency that creates something of a common environment. This should evidence itself in a common approach. And it does.

THE ENGINEERING PREFERENCE
Engineers work on things with a long gestation period. There is time to think. The things they work on can involve large capital investments. There is a lot of incentive for getting it right the first time. In addition, people actually use and not just think about the products of engineering. Do it wrong and health or safety can be affected. This creates moral as well as legal imperatives. Engineering is a world intolerant of error.

Engineers respond to these common conditions in a similar way. It does not matter if they are VPs or practicing professionals. Their most frequent starting point is the Hypothetical Analyzer or HA strategic style. The HA style is characterized by exhaustive research, complete evaluation and a through review of all options. This is the dominant starting point for engineers.

The engineering setting also creates approaches which are to be avoided. Engineers put least reliance on the spontaneous Reactive Stimulator strategic style. The RS option uses expedient means to quickly resolve issues. It is favored where speed matters and/or where the penalty for failure is low. Neither of these conditions are typical in engineering. We would expect this option to be least favored among engineers. And it is. It is at the bottom of the list for everyone from VP to engineering intern.

The distribution of the HA and RS strategic styles are shown in Table 1. Each style registers at a consistent level across all ranks. Statistical tests reveal that there is no significant different between VPs, managers or professional engineers for either the HA or RS style. This consistency can be seen as a product of the common environment that all engineers share.

Graphic 1
DISTRIBUTION OF ENGINEER’S RS and HA
STRATEGIC STYLE COMMITMENT

THE ENGINEERING DIFFERENCES
Rank does have environmental effects. The decision horizon extends farther into the future with higher rank. More time is spent on unusual issues. Executives “do” less and direct more. These changes should be reflected in the engineer’s profile as rank increases. And they do.

The differences can be found in the relative strengths of the two remaining strategic styles—the idea-oriented Relational Innovator (RI) and the disciplined action of the Logical Processor (LP) styles. Graphic 2 shows a statistically significant difference by rank. Yellow coloring highlights this difference.

Graphic 2
DISTRIBUTION OF ENGINEER’S RI and LP
STRATEGIC STYLE COMMITMENT

A loss in Logical Processor (LP) commitment is the most pronounced strategic style effect of moving up in the hierarchy. The LP style is detail sensitive, focused on certainty and concerned with perfect execution.

The LP style declines as engineers move to higher levels. Problems become ever more obscure as rank increases. For example, detail availability decreases with lengthening horizons. Ambiguity rises and this lessens the value of proven methods. Certainty of outcome becomes more questionable with the volatility inherent in a longer perspective. The LP strategy that is optimal in an operating echelon can become dysfunctional at the highest ranks.

The other change happens with the Relational Innovator (RI) style. Between professional and managerial levels there is no change at all. The same strategy that worked at the professional level will probably work at the managerial level. New skills or competencies may have to be learned. However, the basic way the world is perceived and interpreted remains the same.

Moving from manager to VP is another story. The focus changes from what is or can be to what might be. Possibility becomes more important than probability. Variables unconnected to the current situation take center stage. New and unexpected solutions emerge from the morass of factors churning in the VPs world.


QUELLING THE LP
Organizational development faces challenges in engineering. Engineers seeking advancement need support in reducing their reliance on the disciplined LP style. This sounds easy. It is not.

The first step is to explain “why” a change is needed. The LP strategy is skeptical. A logical, consistent and verifiable explanation is needed. “I Opt” technology is an ideal starting point. Showing the effects of shifting time horizons, increased ambiguity and competing values typical of larger scale projects are usually enough to get the initial buy-in. After hearing the explanation engineers will grant that there are changes that have to be accommodated.

A second step puts an emphasis on “how” to make the needed changes. Routine suggestions such as to “think broadly” or “take a chance” will not work. What is needed is a formula not a specific prescription. Engineering covers many areas and it is unlikely that a single global approach will be viable in all of them. However, there are options.

One option is to leverage the engineers strong analytical HA tendencies. For example, a procedure can be setup where the first step is always a challenge. Does the use of detailed, exacting and highly certain methods make sense for this issue? If left on automatic, you may find that strong LPs will be spending more in time and money than the thing they are trying to perfect than it is worth. This initial challenge sets the stage to offset this tendency.

The second step is to have the engineers themselves design another alternative. This will typically involve breaking an issue into its components. For example, is speed important? If so, the little used expedient RS strategy might work. Or, how valuable is precision? If it makes little difference the exacting LP methods might be relaxed.

This is a natural strategy for engineers. This is what they do. All you are doing is redirecting it to the choice of a strategy rather than the actual resolution of an issue. As a bonus, the result will be a plan that is appropriate for the particular kind of engineering being done.


ENHANCING THE RI
The Relational Innovator (RI) style takes on value when moving from the manager to corporate officer. This means that development efforts can be confined to the relatively few engineers who are candidates for the highest level offices. Fewer people mean that more individual attention is possible.

The process of enhancing RI capability first involves explaining exactly what is needed and why it is desirable. Again, “I Opt” technology is ideal for this purpose. It can explain the why and how of the RI style in a logical, rational and totally transparent way.

For example, the ideas created by the RI are not just creative. They are totally unique. They have a breakthrough character. They cannot be derived from the analysis or study of the issue. That approach will create ideas but they will tend to be enhancements to existing technology.

The way the RI achieves a “breakthrough” level of creativity is by working with things totally unrelated to the issue in question. Anything will work. For example, Einstein speculated about the speed of light and in the process “saw” the connection between time and space. No space, no time.

No amount of study, analysis or assessment of then available thought could have led Einstein to his space-time fabric. It requires seeing the connection in unconnected things.

Teaching engineers to enhance their RI strategy involves a little counter-intuitive thinking. Logical connections are discarded, detail is ignored and the engineering tools hard won in years of education are abandoned. This is how you get “fresh eyes.”

Your engineers must return to the fundamentals of their education. They need to focus on how systems and theories themselves are created. The concept of causal relations—x causes y—is basic. Sequence in time continues to be vital—cause precedes result. Connectivity is important—change x and y changes every time. The principles that underlie any theory about anything are the tools of the RI.

The basic process is simple. Use ANYTHING that comes to mind (i.e., the variables). Last night’s dinner, the color of the sky today, the sound of tires as you drove to work—anything. With no natural common denominator, your engineers will be forced to look for one. The “common denominators” that are discovered are the ground from which breakthrough ideas will spring.

The search for denominators is best done using pictures rather than symbols. The reason is that pictures contain as much information as you want to see. Focus on any part of a picture that you can hold in your mind and a thousand aspects (i.e., variables) will appear. In effect, pictures allow you to quickly run a dragnet over a host of possibilities.

One outcome of the “dragnet” may be more pictures. Thinking of the sound of tires might give rise to images of rhythmic waves on oceans. The wave images can cause your engineers to think of aerodynamic turbulence. The pothole that interrupted the sound of the tires might generate an idea on how to modify an equation that will resolve an issue at hand.

This kind of thinking can be a challenge for engineers. Their world is one of exact connections and precise symbols (mathematical or symbolic). It can take a while for engineers to appreciate the value of the unpredictable RI “dragnet” strategy.


RESEARCH SUMMARY
This research has shown that developing engineers for management is a two stage process. The first stage involves controlling LP tendencies. This development stage applies to all levels.

The second stage applies to engineers ready to move from managerial to corporate officer levels. It involves enhancing the engineer’s RI capacities. This is challenging. But everyone has some RI capacity in their behavioral inventory to begin with. It is always a matter of building on what exists. It never involves creating the capacity from scratch.

Identifying the strategic style changes needed as engineers rise in the corporate hierarchy has satisfied the purpose of this research blog. It is beyond the scope of the blog to fully outline how to adjust the LP and RI capacities. However, it is hoped that enough insight was given to launch development efforts in the right direction.

The Pastor as a Leader

By: Gary J. Salton, Ph.D., Chief R&D and CEO
Professional Communications, Inc.

INTRODUCTION
A leader’s position determines their information needs. A supervisor in charge of a specific process works with a short-range horizon and much detail (input). Well-defined processes convert raw information into usable form. The desired outcome is usually explicit (output).

A CEO has a long-run horizon with few details (input). The processes are undefined and vague. The outcome is a judgment that requires balancing often-competing factors (output). Different positions favor different approaches. But helping the transition between levels goes far beyond just learning new competencies. It involves changing world views.

Information is the only vehicle we have to understand the world. The different information flows at the different levels create different understandings. There is situational variation. But there will also be commonalities. In other words, there will be variation around a central theme. The point of central tendency and the degree of variation give us something to study.

The suitability of a strategy determines how well a job can be done. If you pay attention to detail, your long-range vision will be compromised. Details compound geometrically with time and will exhaust the capacity of any mind. If you do not pay attention to detail, you cannot be precise. You will not have the needed data. It is a trade-off. “I Opt” technology translates this common sense observation into a framework of assessment. This gives us a way to conduct the study.

This Research Blog uses “I Opt” technology to evaluate 40 Pastors from 10 Protestant Churches. Data from 160 CEOs, 703 VPs, 3574 managers and 653 supervisor are used as comparison points. The goal is to identify opportunities to improve the leadership performance of pastors.


SHORT-RANGE PREFERENCES
When people encounter situations requiring a decision they usually use a preferred strategic style. “I Opt” defines Strategic Styles as particular combinations of input/process/output elements. You can learn more at www.iopt.com and/or www.oeinstitute.org. You can also click the Styles and Patterns video on the right for a simple explanation.

Pastors are people. They are not exempt from the need to make an initial choice. Table 1 compares the pastor’s median commitment to particular strategies with other executives in the “I Opt” database. The yellow boxes show the initial approach most likely to be used.

Table 1
"I Opt" Strategic Style Commitment
Median Percent of Maximum Possible Commitment

Pastors appear to fit into the strategic style approach used at higher management levels. Pastors are equally likely to use the RI and HA strategies. The RI focuses on creating new options. The HA focuses on analysis and assessment. This posture seems to match common experience of a pastor as a thoughtful idea generator. It rings true.

Not only are the initial approaches compatible with the pastor’s position in the hierarchy, but their other strategic styles also fit in. Chart 1 shows a stair step relation in strategic style commitment at the various levels.

Chart 1
"I Opt" Strategic Style Commitment by Organization Level

Four distinct categories representing five different organizational levels are moving in a lock step. This kind of pattern is no accident. There is a cause driving the pattern. That cause is the information processing demands of each organizational level. In other words, the duties of a position cause people to favor a particular strategic style. They not only favor it in work, they favor it in life. It can come to define their persona in the eyes of others.

A question might arise whether pastors are a distinct category or whether they are merely a part of an existing one. Table 2 answers this question.

Table 2
STATISTICAL DIFFERENCE IN STYLE DISTRIBUTIONS

The first row of Table 2 shows that VPs and Managers handle information in totally different ways. They are truly distinct. They seek different kinds of information, process it differently and target different outcomes. There is no doubt but that VPs and Managers “see” different worlds.

Pastors have a foot in both camps. They differ from VPs in that they give more emphasis to analysis (HA). They differ from Managers in putting less stress on proven, well-understood methods (LP). It is reasonable to consider pastors a distinct category. In other words, pastors are a unique breed.

There are spiritual and secular consequences to the pastor’s choice of initial strategy. Spiritually, their choice is well considered. Spiritual choices tend to be long-run (e.g., salvation) and have intellectual resolution (i.e., what to do). Both analysis (HA) and idea generation (RI) are thought based strategies focused on the longer-term future. They fit with the spiritual mission.

The pastor’s strategy choice may be less than ideal for their secular responsibilities (the church, finances, and administration). This area tends to be shorter-range and responds to intervention (i.e., action). Pastors, as a group, will likely be slow to respond to secular challenges. Difficulties can compound during these delays. This is a point of exposure arising from the pastor’s preferred strategic style approach. A strategy that works well in one dimension may not work as well in another.

Secular and spiritual duties of the pastor are entwined. The church must be maintained as an efficient, functioning entity if the pastor’s spiritual mission is to be fully realized. Paradoxically, the long run HA and RI styles of the pastors can short-circuit actions needed for the secular viability of the church.

Pastoral leadership programs would do well to recognize the consequences of the pastor’s choice in initial strategy. They can give pastors tools to help them make better judgments on these initial decision approaches. It will not always be analysis and ideas.

Pastors have substantial capacity in both the RS (instant action) and LP (disciplined action) styles. Merely sensitizing pastors to this exposure may be enough to yield a gain for both the pastor and the church. Giving them tools for quickly assessing new situations can further improve outcomes. There is opportunity here.

LONG-RANGE PREFERENCES
Strategic Styles are the strategies a person uses to settle issues. If their favored style fails or if added decisions are needed to resolve an issue, people move to their next most favored strategy. The combinations of primary and secondary strategies are called Strategic Patterns.

Strategic Patterns have a precise and mathematical definition. However, for purposes of this research blog is perhaps best to typify them in terms of the maxim likely to be seen in behavior.

Changer:---------“I got an idea, let’s try it”
Conservator:---“Let’s do it once and do it right”
Perfector:-------“Great idea, let’s think it through”
Performer:-----“Let’s get it done! We’ll do it right if we can and anyway if we have to”

Strategic Patterns (i.e., long-term) tend to follow the same systematic progression as shown in Strategic Styles (i.e., short-term). In other words, the pastor’s long-term strategic pattern fits into a stair step hierarchy as neatly as does the short-term strategic style. This is shown in Chart 2.

Chart 2
"I Opt" Strategic Pattern Commitment by Organization Level

Pastors seem to fit best with higher level executives (CEO and VP). Like them, pastors favor a Changer stance (“Great idea! Let’s try it!). Managers and Supervisors lean toward a Conservator posture (“Do it once, do it right!). These longer-term stances are more easily seen in Table 3.

Table 3
"I Opt" STRATEGIC PATTERN COMMITMENT BY RANK
Median Percent of Maximum Possible Commitment

A sharp-eyed reader will notice an anomaly in the otherwise orderly progression. The pastor’s strength in the Performer pattern (far right on Table 3) falls short of all other organizational levels. This is more clearly seen in Chart 3.

Chart 3
"I Opt" PERFORMER PATTERN COMMITMENT

The Performer strategic pattern results confirm the pastor as a unique category. The “Let’s get it done! We’ll do it right if we can and anyway if we have to” stance is ill suited to both the pastor’s secular and spiritual responsibilities. For a pastor, a low commitment to this pattern is the right posture.

Overall, the pastor’s long run decision stance seems to fit well into the leadership hierarchy. Standard leadership development tools are likely to be as effective as they are in the purely secular realm. However, there is a little secret embedded in the statistics.


THE LITTLE SECRET
This analysis used medians. This is the mid-point of a distribution. It is unaffected by people who hold extreme positions. Had we used averages a different aspect of the distribution of pastors would have become visible. Chart 4 shows this condition graphically.

Chart 4
"I Opt" PROFILE FOR PASTORS
(n =40)

There is clustering of pastors in the Conservator Pattern quadrant. A cluster is a bunching of people who tend to view the world through the same color glasses. They will tend to accept the same kind of variables as relevant, process them in roughly equivalent ways and seek the same character of outcomes. In other words, they can form a natural coalition.

The pastor cluster favors disciplined thought (HA) and disciplined action (LP) as a way of conducting life. They are detail sensitive. They tend to be thorough in processing information. They want to be right every time and seek certainty in the outcome. They see obstacles vividly and seek to avoid them.

In contrast, a majority of other pastors see opportunity more vividly than obstacles. They are more dispersed. They will try to realize the opportunity they see in different ways. However, there is commonality. They value new ideas. They are more willing to focus on central aspects of issues rather than details. They are willing to sacrifice certainty for the promise of large gains.

Clustering seems to be more pronounced among pastors than it is in other management categories. Charting the sample variance, an unbiased measure of dispersion in a group, makes this visible. For purposes of this research blog it is enough to say that the higher the sample variance, the more different are members of a group from each other. Chart 5 shows the results of this test.

Chart 5
SAMPLE VARIANCE OF STRATEGIC PATTERNS

The pastor’s Changer and Conservator categories stand out. This confirms that the pastor category is composed of two distinct subgroups that carry the same title. In other words, there is not one kind of pastor but two very different ones.

The “little secret” has implications for leadership. Leadership development programs drawn from the business community will miss the mark. These programs see leadership training in terms of continuum and have built their courses that way. In other words, they did not have clusters to worry about, so they did not build them in.

Adopting these business tools without modification is likely to short-change pastors. Focusing on opportunity oriented pastors automatically disenfranchises those that are obstacle oriented. The same applies in reverse. Focusing on obstacles will be of little value to a pastor whose world centers on creating opportunities. Neither category is “right” or “wrong.” Both obstacles and opportunities exist in the real world. Leadership training must address both of these legitimate stances.

One place to start leadership training for pastors is to introduce them to “I Opt” technology. Pastors in both subcategories are smart people. Showing them the biases inherent in their information-processing postures is often enough to produce a gain. A recognized bias can be offset. An invisible one cannot.

Training can also be adjusted. For example, “vision” is currently seen as a quality of leadership. This is the ability to envision and articulate an end state without knowing exactly how it will be realized. Vision is a natural quality of the Changer Pattern. It makes no sense at all to a Conservator. For them, it is the equivalent of a childhood wish.

Leadership training can be adjusted to accommodate these situations. For example, exercises can be developed to show the Conservator “how” to create a vision. Alternatively, they can be shown how to link a series of shorter-term goals into a system that resembles a long-term vision.

The point to be made is that standard programs do not have to be abandoned. They just need to be adjusted. They need to recognize that pastors are a unique breed with unique needs. Recognizing this gives us an opportunity to improve church leadership in both the secular and spiritual realms. It is an effort worth making.

Fitting the Leader into the Matrix

By: Gary J. Salton, Ph.D., Chief R&D and CEO
Professional Communications, Inc.


ABSTRACT
University and corporate educators prepare people to lead. They typically focus on the leader and the group being lead. Little thought is given to how the new executive fits into the existing management structure. Yet leaders must mesh their efforts with other leaders to be effective. This research blog looks at the leader-to-leader “fit.”

“I Opt” is used to measure the fit. Psychology may apply in a specific situation. Information processing always applies. “I Opt” is part of an information processing based technology. The way information is processed determines how people “understand” issues. A common understanding eases integration while differences can impede it. “I Opt” strategic styles are not the only thing determining “fit.” But they are an important thing.

This research blog uses the “I Opt” profiles of 529 undergrad, MBA and EMBA (i.e., Executive MBA) business students and 3,907 executives. The fit between students and executive levels are measured from both a corporate and university perspective. The implications for leadership education are then specified.


STUDENTS
Chart 1 shows that different levels of business education have different “I Opt” profiles (i.e., information processing patterns).

CHART 1
“I Opt” STRATEGIC STYLES BY STUDENT LEVEL
(111 Business Undergraduates, 293 MBAs, 125 EMBAs)

“I Opt” profiles reflect the ways students acquire and assess new knowledge. For example, an undergraduate will tend to “understand” new knowledge in structural terms—the “how” and “why.” The EMBA will see the knowledge more in terms of opportunity—the “what” and “when.” Effectively, students at different levels will “understand” the same knowledge in different ways.

This finding has teaching implications. The best way to teach an undergrad is not the best way to teach an EMBA. Teaching the same course the same way between levels is a formula for suboptimized learning. Instructional design should know about and adjust for these differences.

Instructors themselves are also affected. Instructors who are effective at one level may not be at another. Delivery as well as content must be adjusted if learning is to be optimized. Knowing when and how to adjust is a necessary component for optimized learning.

Many educators know of these differences from experience. This finding tells them what exists, its direction and its magnitude. Knowing these things opens the door to improved learning. This can be far more effective than waiting for each educator to “discover” the differences for themselves.


EXECUTIVES
Executives also come in gradations. Three categories can be identified. The 1st Level includes titles like supervisor and leader. Mid-level encompasses managers, directors and similar titles. Senior executives include VP, General Manager and the various “C” level titles. The “I Opt” profiles of these categories are shown in Chart 2.

CHART 2
EXECUTIVE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION OF “I Opt” STRATEGIC STYLES
(473 1st Level, 2,850 Mid-Level, 574 Senior Executives)

A “stair step” is again visible. This suggests that the demands of the position—not the field within which it is applied—is the driving factor. In other words, the scope and nature of the different management levels is causing particular “I Opt” profiles to be favored.

The executive “stair step” reflects that of the students. Lower level positions favor structure (the how and why). This posture is oriented toward the present. Higher level positions are more opportunity oriented (the what and when). This is a future oriented stance.

It makes some sense that leaders are more future oriented. Their job is to chart a path. The job of those being lead is to keep the machine running. If this is not done a path to the future is useless. Both qualities are needed in a successful organization. They just reside in different proportions at different levels. Corporate educators would do well to recognize these distinctions.


MATCHING EDUCATION TO MANAGERIAL LEVELS
Chart 3 matches education level with a level in management. Almost all of the undergraduates in the sample are full-time students earning entry-level credentials—the 1st level of management.

The MBAs are a mixture of full and part-time students. Many hold or have held professional positions. Their likely match are the mid-management levels.

The EMBA typically is being groomed for a senior position. Most already hold significant roles in their firms. One of a firm’s motives for sponsoring their education is to ensure a “fit” with their soon-to-be peers. Those peers are likely to be senior executives.

CHART 3
MANAGEMENT vs. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL COMPARISON

There appears to be a rough consistency in match proposed above. Looking a bit deeper into the data can help identify the opportunities imbedded in each level.


EMBA vs. VP Levels
The EMBAs are usually marked by their firms as candidates for senior positions. Chart 4 suggests that part of this judgment may have been based on their management “fit.” Overall, the EMBA’s profile strongly resembles that of senior management.

CHART 4
SENIOR MANAGEMENT vs EMBA STUDENTS

(125 EMBAs, 574 Senior Executives)

While the profiles are highly similar, they are not identical. Educators can help close this gap by accenting the value of idea generation (i.e., options and alternatives) in their teaching. This leverages the EMBA’s substantial existing skills. Sensitizing them to the value of this skill will probably to cause them to hone this skills to higher levels. The gap will close.

Reducing the tendency to approach issues with analysis, assessment and evaluation (HA) is also warranted. Knowing how to judge the analysis of others is more important than knowing how to do the analysis. Educators might want to stress “thumbnail” evaluation techniques, critical factor methods and consistency tests. The integrity of the decision input can be reasonably assured without the high cost of detailed analysis.

Educators do not have to give much attention to the disciplined (LP) or spontaneous (RS) action tendencies of the EMBA. These are already well matched to the senior executive level. In other words, these capacities are already present at about at the right level.

Overall, the EMBA is already well positioned to work on a common plane with other senior executives. But the refinements above will help the EMBA navigate the final steps. The reputation of the teaching institution will also benefit. Its students will seem to “fit” better than those of other schools. The small effort involved will pay everyone dividends.


MBA vs. Mid-Management
Chart 5 shows a looser fit between the MBA profile and that of the executive rank to which they aspire.

CHART 5
MID-MANAGEMENT vs MBA STUDENTS
(293 MBAs, 2,860 Mid-Level Executives)

Classroom experience will not change “I Opt” profiles. But, the way they are deployed can be changed. The prescription is the same as given for the EMBA—just in greater strength. Less analysis (HA) and more emphasis on generating options and ideas (RI) will serve the MBA well.

The wider gap means that sensitizing the average MBA will be more of a challenge. It is likely that instruction will have to be repeated from different angles to have a lasting effect. However, the size of the gap also suggests that the return on this effort will be much higher than with the EMBA.

In addition, the MBA will tend to put about 8% (not shown on the chart) too much value on the deliberate, exacting action (LP). They will also undervalue decisive, spontaneous action (RS) by about 13%. Since the gap in these action dimensions is smaller, the teaching challenge will not be as great. Exercises showing that the cost of exacting action can exceed the value it returns may be enough to make the point.

Overall, the MBA is too focused on structured (i.e., patterned) methods. Guiding them to appreciate the value of spontaneity in both thought (RI) and action (RS) will pay dividends. They will be more “in tune” with fast paced demands of their mid-management target.


Undergraduate vs. 1st Level Management
Undergraduates follow the MBAs in their “fit” with the level to which they likely aspire. Chart 6 shows the pattern is the same but the difference is less severe.

CHART 6
1st LEVEL MANAGEMENT vs UNDERGRADUATES
(111 Undergraduates, 473 1st Level Executives)

Some undergraduates may be early in their careers and preparing for professional non-management positions. To test whether this would cause a change in diagnosis an added test was run. Undergraduate profiles were matched to those of 527 non-managerial professionals. The results are shown in Chart 7.

CHART 7
NON- MANAGEMENT
PROFESSIONALS vs UNDERGRADUATES

(111 Undergraduates, 527 Non-Management Professionals)

The fit between undergraduates and professionals is closer but the pattern is the same. The students will tend to over stress structural approaches (LP and HA—the how and why) and devalue spontaneous methods (RI and RS—the what and when).

Overall, the educator’s return for adjusting their strategy will be less than realized for the MBA. But there will still be a positive return. Students sensitized to the value of unpatterned methods will tend to integrate better with their peers as well as those at a higher level (i.e., mid-management). It’s an effort worth making.


CORPORATE TRAINING IMPLICATIONS
Corporate educators do not work with students. They focus on preparing employees to assume higher levels of responsibility. The educational challenge is the same. Only the subjects change.

Chart 8 shows “I Opt” styles for various levels of management. “I Opt” profiles for 527 non-management professionals have been added since they are in the corporate educator’s mix.

CHART 8
"I Opt" STYLES BY MANAGEMENT LEVEL

The “stair step” pattern is again visible. What this means is that increasing responsibility will involve both growth and decline. And both happen at the same time. The spontaneous, unpatterned strategies of RS and RI grow. The disciplined, structured strategies of HA and LP decline. Education is a matter of change, not just “growth.”

Overall, the prescription for corporate and university educators is the same. The higher the level being targeted, the greater the emphasis on unpatterned strategies—in both thought and action (RI and RS).

But don’t overdo it. The objective is to target the level being addressed not some ultimate level. Each level has its own “optimal” profile. Both university and corporate educators have to be smart enough to recognize this. There is no single, universal leadership profile. There are many.

But there is a universal. That universal is the need for continuous change as responsibilities change. There is no right or wrong. Different levels just confront different issues that demand different ways of seeing the world.

If leaders are to be fully successful they must be prepared to make these transitions at the appropriate time. Too early and they may compromise their ability to attain the role to which they aspire. Too late and they may have trouble keeping the job or progressing further.


A BIG CAVEAT
This research blog used averages. Averages apply to groups, not to individuals. To illustrate this Chart 9 shows the “I Opt” strength distribution of the 473 Senior Executives that were averaged for this study.

CHART 9
SENIOR MANAGEMENT
STYLE STRENGTH DISTRIBUTION
(473 Senior Executives )

The senior executive ranks include people using a variety of strategic profiles. What this means is that there is no “silver bullet” profile. However, there are odds. Those odds will favor people who subscribe to “I Opt” strategies that are proven at the managerial level in question. The “most proven” of these tend to center around the average for the level being targeted.

Used with understanding and caution, the results of this research blog can be helpful to an individual. The results can be offered as a probability assessment rather than as a prescriptive formula. Used this way it may instill a level of flexibility and tolerance for change. This will serve them well throughout their career.

Leadership, Diversity and the Goldilocks Zone

By: Gary J. Salton, Ph.D., Chief R&D and CEO
Professional Communications, Inc.


ABSTRACT
Leaders lead teams. Teams are a tool for getting things done. The leader must decide how to configure a team so that it best meets the needs of the task at hand. One important aspect of design is the size of the team. Another is the particular people chosen as team members. This Research Blog addresses these subjects using hard data rather than opinion and is set in language accessible to anyone.


INITIAL DATA
Actual data was drawn from 3,815 teams. All functions are represented including engineering, IT, finance, medicine and manufacturing among many others. They include profit, non-profit and government organizations. It is a reasonable sample of actual teams operating in the real world. The team size distribution is shown on Chart 1.

CHART 1
DISTRIBUTION OF TEAM SIZE

Chart 1 shows a “Goldilocks” zone. The area between 4 and 9 people is 25% of the distribution but contains 60% of the teams. This clustering effect suggests that there are forces causing leaders to create teams in the “Goldilocks” range as optimal for their purpose.


THE COST OF TEAMS
The first factor influencing optimal team size is cost. Every added person adds costs. From a leader’s viewpoint, this cost is framed in the difficulty of guiding and coordinating increasing numbers of people. But the cost is not confined to the leader, it is experienced by all concerned. The concept of Transaction Channel is central to its understanding.

A transaction channel is a relation between 2 people in which the actions of one are determined (at least in part) by the actions of the other. In other words, all parties have to pay attention to what the other is doing, assess it and then decide what to do about it. Communication channels are passive. Transaction channels are active and expensive for all involved.

GRAPHIC 1
TRANSACTION VS COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS

Transaction channels increase exponentially with team size. Movie 1 shows the process. What starts out as a simple diagram ends up as a bowl of spaghetti. Leaders choosing team sizes that exceed maintenance capacity no longer have a team. They have a group. The advantages of teams will have been lost.

MOVIE 1
TEAM SIZE AND TRANSACTION CHANNELS

The "right" size of a team depends on the objective being pursued. Leaders set these objectives. They have a choice of pursuing them as a whole or breaking them into pieces. Small teams can pursue narrow objectives. Broad objectives usually demand big teams. If the leader sets too broad an objective excessive cost will have been “built in.” Everybody will pay.

The relation of team size and transaction channels is given by the Combination Formula. The result of applying it to team size is shown in Chart 2. The growth in complexity is geometric.

CHART 2
TRANSACTION CHANNELS VS TEAM SIZE

Firms who sponsor the teams in the database all have a history. It is likely that experience taught them to recognize team sizes that seem to work. The clustering of teams in the “Goldilocks” zone is the expression of this common judgment. At the upper limit it translates to about 40 transaction channels.

There are teams that lie outside the “Goldilocks” zone. But if a leader chooses to exceed the "Goldilocks" limits, there should be a very good reason. The increase in complexity (i.e., cost) is certain. It will be paid by the leader in terms of increased guidance and by the team members in terms of increased complexity. The leader should be confident that the expected value of a larger team size should be enough to offset this certain cost.


MEASURING DIVERSITY
Most kinds of diversity are obvious. Age, gender, race and occupational specialization (e.g., engineers, physicians, etc.) are examples. If these are deemed to be important, a diversity mix is easily fashioned. Physical appearance or standard corporate records are usually all that is needed to identify team candidates.

There is one form of diversity that is not obvious—thought diversity. Thought diversity is simply the different ways people can view and address a particular subject. This diversity is embedded in everyone. Engineers can be spontaneous, idea generators or they can be disciplined, methodical juggernauts. Every other category of diversity contains this veiled component. This “secret” form of diversity is what will determine the success of a team.

“I Opt” is a tool that measures the information processing preferences of people. The way we process information determines how we approach issues. For example, if you do not pay attention to detail you will not be precise. It does not matter what you think about it or how hard you try. You have not got the data. On the other hand, focusing on detail limits long-range planning since there are no “facts” about what has not yet occurred. A focus on relationships is a better strategy.

There are more dimensions to thought diversity (see other entries in this blog). However, the above is enough to illustrate the condition. Taking in different kinds of information and processing them in particular ways creates a valid perspective. The mix of these perspectives is what equips (or limits) a team’s ability to get a job done. “I Opt” has defined these thought perspectives as Strategic Styles. They are strategic in that they are a general approach to life's issues. They are styles in that they tend to be applied throughout a person’s life—not just at work but everywhere. They are dependable.

Information processing preferences (strategic styles) can be measured exactly. The maximum diversity any team can have is shown in Chart 3. The area covered can be considered 100%. No matter how many people you add, you cannot exceed these boundaries.

CHART 3
MAXIMUM POSSIBLE TEAM DIVERSITY

Chart 3 represents a real but theoretical limit. The highest level recorded in the 3,815 teams was 71.2% of that maximum. The reason is simple. If all possible perspectives were brought to bear on a particular issue, nothing would get done. In most real life situations, part of the leader’s job is to set a general direction. This limits the desired thought diversity. For example, if the leader’s goal is replacing a heart valve, there is little value in including people good at expedient action. Including that capacity on the surgical team would be dysfunctional. Diversity is not a universal "good."

Thought diversity is a characteristic of the individual as well as of a team. We all can get ideas, plan, react spontaneously or execute with precision. We tend to favor one or another style, but the capacity for doing everything is within us all. The “I Opt” profile as shown in Chart 4 shows a typical “I Opt” profile. You can note that the profile touches each of the four strategic styles.

CHART 4
INDIVIDUAL DIVERSITY: THE "I OPT" PROFILE EXAMPLE

The lower theoretical level of individual diversity is zero. However, the only place you would find such people is in mental institutions. In the practice of OD the most typical level will be 19.4% of the theoretical maximum (Chart 3). In other words, a person approaching an issue alone will only cover about 20% of options. This is one of the big reasons we work in teams. Working alone we will probably not see all of the relevant dimensions of an issue.

Adding one person does not double the diversity of a single person. The reason is that profiles overlap. Some portion of the thought diversity the added person brings will already have been covered by the first. This is not bad. This commonality is the basis of mutual understanding. It allows us to work together. This condition is shown on Chart 5.

CHART 5
DIVERSITY CHANGE: ADDING ONE PERSON

An example of an actual five-person team used in this study is shown in Chart 6. The outer boundary of all of the overlapping profiles defines the total diversity of the team as a whole. The gray area defines the majority, it is the area where common positions are most easily reached. Both pieces are needed for a team to operate effectively.

CHART 6
TEAM DIVERSITY AND COMMONALITY
A TYPICAL 5 PERSON TEAM EXAMPLE

The interest of this Blog centers on thought diversity rather than commonality. The outer boundary of the overlaid profiles sets diversity limits. It determines the range of options. For example, if there is no one with an appreciable level of Reactive Stimulator (RS) in the group, the possibility of an expedient solution will probably never arise. If this were relevant (it was not in the surgical example), the team would have been denied access to a valid alternative. Cost, effectiveness or both can be negatively impacted.

The availability of a right level of thought diversity is one of the major benefits of teams versus division of labor work groups. Part of a leader’s responsibility is to create the right level of diversity. Too little and viable options disappear. Too much diversity and the team can be paralyzed. The delays inherent in divergent perspectives can be just as costly as too few options.


THOUGHT DIVERSITY IN TEAMS
The initial 3,815-team dataset are real teams. However, they are a bit of a jumble. They can include transitory teams, “teams” of loosely associated people or teams with a less than well-defined purpose. It was decided use subset of this larger group. The subset includes 1,196 teams where the leader of the group was known. In many cases, the leader’s title was also available. The dataset is still large and does provide increased assurance that the teams were focused on serious purpose.

The diversity index of each team was calculated and set as an increase in diversity over a single person. Thus, 150% indicates that the team increases diversity by about one and a half times. Said another way, the team has the equivalent of 250% of individual diversity.

Movie 2 shows the distribution of diversity indexes by team size. The movie shows both the mid-point (i.e., median) and the distribution (i.e., range) of each size of group considered in this study. It also explains in more detail the forces that affect diversity as it is applied in a team context.

MOVIE 2
TEAM DIVERSITY BY TEAM SIZE

A more abstract but inclusive way of looking at team diversity in relation to size shown in Chart 6. The "Goldilocks" zone generated by team size is superimposed on these diversity levels.

CHART 7
TEAM DIVERSITY versus TEAM SIZE

Chart 7 shows that within the "Goldilocks" zone the increase in thought diversity rises rapidly. In other words, every increase in the number of people on the team yields a large increase in the diversity of perspectives. Beyond the "Goldilocks" zone, the diversity value of each additional member decreases. But the cost grows exponentially (see Chart2). The interaction of increasing cost and diminishing diversity value is what causes the "Goldilocks" zone to be created.

Does thought diversity vary by organizational level? Table 1 shows that a common process appears to drive all teams, from President to Supervisor. A diversity index of about 150% over a single person (i.e., 250% total) and a team size of about 9 people appear to be a common standard.

TABLE 1
TEAM DIVERSITY AND TEAM SIZE
BY ORGANIZATIONAL RANK

SUMMARY
The fact that transaction channels impose costs is beyond question. However, we cannot offer a causal (what causes what and why) formula for why about 40 transaction channels appear to begin to tax the upper limit. Similarly, it is beyond question that different perspectives can contribute to team success. However, why a diversity index of about 150% over an individual seems to signal a level of diminishing value is unknown.

While we lack exact formulas, the findings in this blog can be useful to actual and prospective leaders. Just becoming aware of the nature of the costs and benefits of team design is enough to prevent most catastrophic errors. Being able to attach a measure to both costs and benefits further enhances the probability of success. While not yet complete, this appears to be a useful step forward.